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Abstract If consumers have a choice of health plan, risk
selection is often a serious problem (e.g., as in Germany,
Israel, the Netherlands, the United States of America, and
Switzerland). Risk selection may threaten the quality of
care for chronically ill people, and may reduce the
affordability and efficiency of healthcare. Therefore, an
important question is: how can the regulator show evidence
of (no) risk selection? Although this seems easy, showing
such evidence is not straightforward. The novelty of this
paper is two-fold. First, we provide a conceptual frame-
work for showing evidence of risk selection in competitive
health insurance markets. It is not easy to disentangle risk
selection and the insurers’ efficiency. We suggest two
methods to measure risk selection that are not biased by the
insurers’ efficiency. Because these measures underestimate
the true risk selection, we also provide a list of signals of
selection that can be measured and that, in particular in
combination, can show evidence of risk selection. It is
impossible to show the absence of risk selection. Second,
we empirically measure risk selection among the switchers,
taking into account the insurers’ efficiency. Based on
2-year administrative data on healthcare expenses and risk
characteristics of nearly all individuals with basic health
insurance in the Netherlands (N[ 16 million) we find
significant risk selection for most health insurers. This is
the first publication of hard empirical evidence of risk
selection in the Dutch health insurance market.
Keywords Health insurance  Risk equalization  Risk
selection
JEL Classification I110  I130  I180
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, consumers in an increasing number
of countries have had a choice of health plan for basic
health insurance. This is the case in, e.g., Belgium,
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, and the United States of
America (see, e.g., [20]). Consumer choice on the health
insurance market is assumed to discipline insurers to
increase efficiency and to be responsive to consumers’
preferences. Because unregulated competitive insurance
markets result in risk-rated premiums and risk selection, all
countries have regulated their health insurance markets to
make basic health insurance affordable for all. To organize
cross-subsidies, all of these countries implemented a risk
equalization system in combination with regulations such
as open enrollment (no refusal of eligible applicants), no
exclusion of preexisting medical conditions, standardized
insurance coverage, restrictions on the consumers’ out-of-
pocket premiums, and restrictions on copayments. How-
ever, due to imperfections in the risk equalization systems
in all countries there are groups of high-risk consumers
(e.g., chronically ill people) who are substantially under-
compensated, resulting in incentives for risk selection.
Even in the presence of the above-mentioned regulations
many forms of risk selection are possible (see ‘‘Forms of
risk selection’’). Risk selection may threaten the quality of
care for chronically ill people, and may reduce the
affordability and efficiency of healthcare. Therefore, an
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important question is: How can the regulator who is
responsible for organizing the cross-subsidies show evi-
dence of (no) risk selection in health insurance markets?
Although it seems easy, showing such evidence is not
straightforward.
The relevance of our paper is that, although we know
that in many countries there are substantial incentives for
risk selection, we do not know (1) whether or not risk
selection really occurs in practice, and (2) if it occurs, to
what extent, with which forms of selection, and with which
negative effects for society. Because it is hard to observe
risk selection, there may be ‘hidden negative effects’ of
risk selection, as mentioned above. In this paper we pro-
vide a conceptual framework for showing evidence of risk
selection that regulators can use. If regulators are able to
show evidence of risk selection, they can take actions to
reduce or avoid these negative effects. If regulators cannot
show evidence of risk selection, the ‘hidden negative
effects’ of selection may continue to exist.
The novelty of this paper is two-fold. First, we provide a
conceptual framework for showing evidence of risk
selection in competitive health insurance markets. Second,
as an empirical illustration we apply one of the methods of
measuring risk selection, using 2-year administrative data
on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of nearly all
individuals with basic health insurance in the Netherlands
(N[ 16 million). The results are the first to show hard
empirical evidence of risk selection in the Dutch health
insurance market.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next
section, we discuss risk equalization and several aspects of
risk selection in competitive health insurance markets.
Unlike most other studies, we give a definition of risk
selection. For concepts, terminology, and definitions see
Table 1. After that, we focus on showing evidence of risk
selection, both conceptually and empirically. Finally, the
conclusions are summarized, followed by a discussion and
policy recommendations.
Cross-subsidies and risk selection
To achieve the desired cross-subsidies the regulator
requires that health insurers participate in a risk equaliza-
tion system. Insurers with an overrepresentation of insured
customers with high predicted expenses receive a higher
risk-adjusted equalization payment from the equalization
fund than insurers with an overrepresentation of low-risk
insured. In addition, insurers may charge a premium to
their enrollees. If the risk equalization is perfect, the cross-
subsidies are achieved as intended by the regulator.
Restrictions on the premium rates are then unnecessary. In
practice, however, risk equalization is still imperfect and
therefore most regulators aim to achieve the intended
cross-subsidies by enforcing restrictions on the premium
rates, such as a community rating or a premium bandwidth.
Definition of risk selection
In Europe, the risk equalization ranges from primitive in
Israel (age, gender, and region only) to quite sophisticated
(with health indicators based on diagnostic information,
prior utilization, and/or prior costs) in Belgium, Germany,
and the Netherlands (see, e.g., [18, 22]). Although the
research on risk adjustment started some 30 years ago, all
risk equalization formulas currently used in practice sub-
stantially undercompensate selected groups of high-risk
consumers, e.g., the chronically ill. For example, Table 2
presents the average under- and overcompensation per
person in year t using the Dutch risk equalization formula-
2014 for selected groups based on information from year
t - 1.
By enforcing restrictions on the premium rates, the
regulator enforces the insurers to put over- and under-
compensated groups of insured customers into one pool
and to charge these heterogeneous risks the same premium.
By doing so, the regulator aims at achieving implicit cross-
subsidies as a complement to the explicit cross-subsidies
that are realized via the risk equalization. However, these
implicit cross-subsidies result in predictable losses and
profits on selected groups of insured, which then provide
the consumers and insurers with incentives to exploit that
unpriced risk heterogeneity (i.e., the risk heterogeneity
within each risk group as discerned in the risk equalization)
and break these pooling arrangements [12]. For example,
the over- and undercompensated insured may choose sep-
arate health plans that are attuned to their specific prefer-
ences. With community ratings per health plan the
overcompensated insured then pay a low premium for their
product, and the undercompensated insured pay a high
premium. Despite the community rating requirement, the
cross-subsidies as intended by the regulator are then not
fully achieved. One can think of many actions that result in
such market segmentation. Selection refers to these actions
or to the outcomes of these actions [12]. We adjust New-
house’s definition to the context of regulated competitive
health insurance markets with risk equalization, and define
risk selection as ‘actions (other than risk rating per health
plan) by consumers and insurers with the goal and/or the
effect that the cross-subsidies as intended by the regulator
are not fully achieved’ [25]. Our definition of risk selection
includes all forms of selection, such as adverse (risk)
selection, preferred (risk) selection, direct selection, and
indirect selection.
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Table 1 Glossary
Cross-subsidies We primarily focus on cross-subsidies from the low-risks to the high-risks. That is, we primarily focus on ‘risk-solidarity’
(and not on ‘income-solidarity’)
Equalization fund The fund, managed by the regulator, out of which equalization payments are made. This fund can be filled with
contributions by, e.g., consumers, insurers, government, and/or employers
Equalization
payment
The payment per insured that an insurer receives from (if positive) or has to pay to (if negative) the equalization fund. In
many countries the insurer may charge the insured an out-of-pocket premium
Health insurer Risk-bearing entity that offers health plans, sometimes denoted as sickness fund
Health insurance
agent
An agent or intermediary who advises consumers, and/or who sells health plans on behalf of the insurer; the agent may be
authorized by the insurer to perform administrative functions. The insurer is the risk-bearing entity
Health plan Health insurance product. All consumers who have the same ‘health plan’ have an identical contract with the insurer
concerning benefits coverage, cost-sharing, quality, services, etc. An insurer may offer different health plans
Regulator The entity that regulates and supervises the health insurance market, e.g., government, an entity empowered by
government, or (a group of) employers (sometimes named sponsor, Health Alliance, Health Insurance Purchasing
Cooperative, Connector, Health Insurance Exchange)
Residual expenses The actual expenses minus the risk-adjusted predicted expenses
Risk adjuster See ’risk adjustment’
Risk adjustment A technique used to calculate risk-adjusted predicted health expenses based on the individual’s risk characteristics (‘risk
adjusters’)
Risk equalization A system of risk-adjusted equalization payments to and from insurers aimed at achieving the cross-subsidies from the low-
risks to the high-risks as intended by the regulator
Risk selection Actions (other than risk rating per health plan) by consumers and insurers with the goal and/or the effect that the cross-
subsidies as intended by the regulator are not fully achieved
Table 2 Average under- and overcompensation per person in year t for selected groups based on information from year t - 1, using the Dutch
risk equalization formula-2014
Selected groups based on
information from year t - 1
Estimated percentage
of population
Undercompensation
(-) in year t
Predictive
ratio* in year t
Reduction of undercompensation
compared with no risk equalization
Worst score physical health (SF-
12)
18.9 % -€670 0.85 –75 %
Contact with a medical specialist
in the last 12 months
37.8 % -€326 0.90 –75 %
Use of physiotherapy in the last
12 months
21.8 % -€328 0.89 –71 %
At least one chronic condition 31.5 % -€331 0.90 –80 %
Selected groups based on
information from year t - 1
Estimated
percentage of
population
Overcompensation
(?) in year t
Predictive
ratio* in year t
Reduction of overcompensation
compared with no risk equalization
No chronic condition 68.5 % ?€152 1.16 –66 %
Best score physical health (SF-12) 19.2 % ?€291 1.31 –71 %
No health care utilization in the last
12 months
19.5 % ?€298 1.51 –75 %
Highest education levels 22.8 % ?€142 1.10 –61 %
Because the Dutch government requires a community rating per health plan, for each selected group the average under- and overcompensation
per person has been calculated as the average residual expenses per person. All presented under- and overcompensations are statistically
significant at the 0.01 level, except for ‘‘highest education levels’’, which are statistically significant at the 0.05 level
The Dutch risk equalization model of 2014 is based on the following risk characteristics, which over time have been added successively: age
interacted with gender (1993), region (1995), source of income interacted with age (1999), pharmacy-based cost groups (2002), diagnoses-based
cost groups (2004), socioeconomic status interacted with age (2008), multiple-year high costs (2012), yes/no student, and prior use of durable-
medical-equipment (2014)
* The predictive ratio equals the ratio of the average predicted expenses and the average actual expenses of the individuals in the selected group
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Forms of risk selection
In Table 3, we discern four types of actions that in the case
of imperfect risk equalization and premium rate restrictions
can be qualified as risk selection. By requiring open
enrollment and a mandate to buy health insurance, most
regulators prohibit two straightforward forms of selection:
(1) ‘insurers refusing high-risk applicants’ (type-1 action)
and (2) ‘low-risk consumers refusing to buy health insur-
ance’ (type-3 action). But many other forms of risk
selection are not forbidden by most regulators. For exam-
ple, an insurer offering the best care for chronically ill
patients who are substantially undercompensated by the
risk equalization may attract a disproportionally large
number of undercompensated insured, and therefore has to
increase his premium. Consequently, the cross-subsidies as
intended by the regulator are not fully achieved. This
example illustrates that it is not correct to associate risk
selection exclusively with actions by insurers with the goal
to attract overcompensated insured. Risk selection also
comprises actions by consumers as well as the effects of
actions (that were primarily not intended to selectively
attract overcompensated insured).
Although our definition of risk selection may seem quite
broad, a more narrow definition would make no sense
because often it is not possible to discern (1) whether an
action is taken by the consumer or by the insurer, and
whether (2) the non-achievement of the cross-subsidies as
intended by the regulator is the goal or (only) the effect of
an action. For example, the selection due to selective
contracting can be the result of the action by an insurer
(contracting only with a panel of selected providers) that
was not intended to attract overcompensated insured, but it
can also be the result of the actions of the overcompensated
consumers choosing the health plan with a limited provider
network. Often, it is a combination of actions by the insurer
and the insured. It is also important to stress that the word
‘goal’ in the definition of risk selection does not imply that
there is no risk selection if that goal is not achieved. There
can be severe risk selection even if the ‘actions with the
goal’ do not achieve their goal, e.g., because all insurers are
equally successful in selection. In addition, there can be
actions with the effect that the cross-subsidies as intended
by the regulator are not fully achieved, while this was not
the goal of these actions.
Note that the four types of actions in Table 3 can only
be qualified as risk selection if the risk equalization is
imperfect and if there are premium rate restrictions. In the
case of perfect risk equalization, the cross-subsidies as
intended by the regulator are fully achieved (no under- or
overcompensations) and by definition, risk selection is
nonexistent (except for actions by insurers who incorrectly
think that the risk equalization is imperfect). In the case of
no premium rate restrictions, insurers in a competitive
market will adjust their premium rates to the under- and
overcompensations by the risk equalization, rather than
applying risk selection.1
Despite the open enrollment requirement there can be
many different forms of risk selection in the case of
imperfect risk equalization, for example, health plan dis-
crimination (i.e., the offered health plans being attuned to
the preferences of the different under- and overcompen-
sated groups of insured), distorting the quality level of the
offered plans, providing the doctors and hospitals with
incentives for selection, selective advertising and market-
ing, and selection via insurance agents, group contracts, or
supplementary insurances (see ‘‘Signals of risk selection’’).
Effects of risk selection
The effects of selection may be different for the different
types of action, as discerned in Table 3. All forms of
selection may result in market segmentation with the over-
and undercompensated insured choosing different health
plans with different (community-rated) premiums.
Table 3 Four types of actions that in the case of imperfect risk equalization and premium rate restrictions can be qualified as risk selection
Actions with the goal Actions with the effect
Actions by
insurers
Type-1 action
Example: being non-responsive (e.g., via benefit design) to the
preferences of unhealthy people with the goal to keep these
people away from the health plan
Type-2 action
Example: improving the quality of care for unhealthy people
with the side-effect that the insurer attracts a disproportionally
large number of these people
Actions by
consumers
Type-3 action
Example: healthy consumers choose a limited provider plan
with a low premium with the goal to avoid paying a higher
premium that contains (more) cross-subsidies to the unhealthy
consumers (market segmentation)
Type-4 action
Example: unhealthy consumers choose high-cost, high-quality
plans more often than the healthy, with the effect that these
groups end up in different pools with different premiums
(market segmentation)
Healthy consumers are assumed to be overcompensated and unhealthy are assumed to be undercompensated
1 There may be some risk selection if the costs of further premium
differentiation are too high.
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Consequently, the cross-subsidies as intended by the reg-
ulator are then not fully achieved.
Another potential effect of selection, in particular of
type-1 actions, is a reduction of efficiency. When the
expected returns on selection, which are substantial (see,
e.g., Shen and Ellis [17] and Table 2), exceed those on
efficiency improvements, insurers are confronted, at least
in the short term, with financial incentives to invest in
selection rather than in improving efficiency. Even if all
insurers are equally successful in this type of selection (and
therefore no insurer has a selective risk composition of
insured), their incentives for efficiency are reduced, at least
in the short run.
The most worrisome form of selection is a specific form
of type-1 action, i.e., service level distortion, e.g., by
underprovision of services preferred by the undercompen-
sated insured and overprovision of services preferred by the
overcompensated insured (e.g., [2, 5, 7]. For this type of
risk selection it is not necessary that insurers know which
individuals are under- or overcompensated by the risk
equalization. It is sufficient for them to know that patients
with disease X who have relatively strong preferences for
good quality of treatment Y are undercompensated. Insurers
may then skimp the quality of care that is particularly used
by the undercompensated, high-cost insured. They may
also give poor service to the undercompensated insured and
choose not to contract with providers who have the best
reputations for treating their diseases. This, in turn, can
discourage physicians and hospitals from acquiring such a
reputation. That would be an undesirable outcome of a
competitive healthcare system. Even if all insurers are
equally successful in this type of selection, and therefore
have the same risk composition of insured, this type of risk
selection threatens the quality of care for the undercom-
pensated patients.
Another possible outcome is that some insurers spe-
cialize in care for undercompensated high-risk patients and
charge them a relatively high premium. In that case, the
undercompensated high-risk patients receive good care and
good services only if they are able and willing to pay the
high premium.
In theory, type-1 actions, most of which are not in
violation of the regulations, seem the most worrisome
forms of risk selection. Nevertheless, in practice it is hard
to disentangle the four types of selection actions. It is very
hard to assess whether a health plan with a restricted panel
of providers was set up with the goal to improve efficiency
or to discourage undercompensated people from joining the
health plan. Even more difficult is to show whether a
potential improvement in healthcare has not been imple-
mented because of efficiency (no cost-effective care), or
because implementation would encourage undercompen-
sated people to join the health plan. This illustrates that the
effects of risk selection may be (largely) invisible: for
example, we will never know how good the quality of care
for the undercompensated high-cost patients would have
been in the case of perfect risk equalization.
Showing evidence of risk selection: A conceptual
framework
Showing evidence of risk selection requires showing evi-
dence of ‘‘actions with the goal and/or the effect that the
cross-subsidies as intended by the regulator are not fully
achieved’’. Because it is hard to show evidence of the goal
of certain actions, we will first concentrate on showing
evidence of the effects of actions. In doing so, we first
restrict ourselves to showing evidence that the cross-sub-
sidies as intended by the regulator are not fully achieved.
We discuss two methods of estimating risk selection
(‘‘Residual expenses’’ and ‘‘Overrepresentation of over- or
undercompensated groups’’). First, we discuss residual
expenses as an estimate of risk selection (‘‘Residual
expenses’’). Second, the level of overrepresentation of
over- or undercompensated groups per insurer or health
plan is discussed as an estimate of risk selection (‘‘Over-
representation of over- or undercompensated groups’’).
Third, we provide a list of signals of selection that can be
measured and that, in particular in combination, can show
evidence of risk selection (‘‘Signals of risk selection’’).
Residual expenses
Showing evidence that ‘‘the cross-subsidies as intended by
the regulator are not fully achieved’’ requires that it is
known what these intended cross-subsidies are. These
intended cross-subsidies2 can be derived from (1) the risk
equalization payments per insured and (2) the restrictions
on the premium rates. For example, in the case of com-
munity ratings per health plan an identical risk distribution
across the health plans is implicitly assumed to yield the
cross-subsidies as intended by the regulator. In most
European countries the equalization payment per individ-
ual equals the risk-adjusted predicted expenses for that
individual minus p % of the overall average expenses per
person,3 with, e.g., p = 0 in Israel, p = 50 in the Nether-
lands, and p = 100 in Switzerland.4 In addition, the insurer
2 Additional subsidies, such as income-related subsidies to low-
income people, are not relevant for our discussion of risk selection.
3 In the USA’s Medicare Advantage system, the risk equalization
payment equals a certain percentage of the predicted expenses in
traditional Medicare.
4 In the Netherlands, p = 0 for children up to the age of 18; in
Switzerland, children up to the age of 18 are exempted from risk
equalization.
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may charge the insured a community-rated premium
reflecting the insurer’s efficiency.5 This implies that in
most European countries the cross-subsidies as intended by
the regulator are such that the ‘residual expenses (i.e.,
actual expenses minus risk-adjusted predicted expenses) in
the case of perfect risk equalization’ for each insured in
expectation are zero, assuming average efficiency.
‘‘Cross-subsidies such that the residual expenses on each
insured in expectation are zero’’ imply that ex-ante the
statistically expected/predicted residual expenses are zero
for each insured. Because the unpredictable variation in
individual residual expenses is large, ex-post there will
always be a large variation in the actual residual expenses
per individual insured, even with perfect risk equalization.
Therefore, showing evidence of risk selection cannot be
done on the basis of one individual insured who ex-post (by
accident) has extreme positive or negative residual
expenses. Showing evidence of risk selection requires a
sufficiently large number of individuals and can only be
done with a certain level of statistical significance.6
One could be inclined to measure risk selection by
calculating for each insurer the average residual expenses
of its insured.7 The intuitive idea to do so is that if an
insurer has an overrepresentation of overcompensated
insured, this insurer will have, after risk equalization,
lower-than-average residual expenses per insured and vice
versa. The conclusion could then be that, if these average
residual expenses are different from zero for at least one
insurer, with a certain level of statistical significance, there
is risk selection because at least one insurer is over- or
undercompensated and thus the cross-subsidies as intended
by the regulator are not fully achieved.8 However, in most
cases this conclusion is incorrect and the measure of risk
selection is biased, as will be argued below.
Biased estimates of selection because of differences
in insurers’ efficiency
Because the insurers’ average residual expenses are influ-
enced by both selection and the insurers’ efficiency, these
average residual expenses are biased estimates of risk
selection if they are not adjusted for the differences in
insurers’ efficiency. For example, negative average resid-
ual expenses per insurer can be the consequence of (1)
being more efficient than average (and no risk selection),
and/or (2) risk selection (and having average efficiency).
Therefore, it is important to take care that the measure of
risk selection is not biased by the insurer’s efficiency.9
Insurers’ efficiency has two components: (1) efficiency
at the insurer level, i.e., the insurer provides healthcare
efficiently or has selectively contracted efficient providers;
and (2) efficiency at the insured level, i.e., the insured have
a preference for efficiency.10 These two components can go
together, but not necessarily. For example, an insurer with
average efficiency but with an effective marketing cam-
paign in creating a reputation of ‘delivering (or contract-
ing) efficient and appropriate and no unnecessary care’
may attract many insured who prefer to make use of
healthcare services in an efficient way and who avoid
unnecessary care. Consequently, this insurer will have
lower than average expenses within the risk groups used
for the risk equalization. Although this insurer has a
selective risk composition of insured, there is no risk
selection because this situation could also occur in the case
5 In Israel, insurers are not allowed to charge a premium. Dutch
insurers are not allowed to charge a premium to children. In
Switzerland, there are different community-rated premiums for the
age groups 0–18, 19–25, and 26 ? per insurer per canton. In the
health insurance exchanges in the USA, the premium may be
conditioned on age (1:3), smoking (1:1.5), family size, and geogra-
phy, but not on other risk characteristics.
6 Nevertheless, one person can be sufficient for the existence of risk
selection, e.g., an insurer’s action with the goal that an insured who is
expected to be undercompensated will disenroll.
7 The insurers’ average residual expenses of their insured could be
interpreted as (a proxy for) the financial result they would achieve
under identical premiums and identical administrative costs (includ-
ing additional revenues, e.g., due to interest).
8 The average residual expenses for selected groups of insured in the
population (e.g., those with the worst health status) indicate that, with
a certain level of statistical significance, there are incentives for risk
selection (because some selected groups are over- or undercompen-
sated). For an example, see Table 2.
9 The importance of disentangling the effects of selection and
efficiency is nicely illustrated by McGuire et al. [7] as follows: ‘‘Ellis
and McGuire [4] measure predictability, predictiveness, and the
consequent incentives to ration services among plans competing in
Medicare using data from traditional Medicare (not the managed care
component for which data were not available). Cao and McGuire [2]
in Medicare and Eggleston and Bir [3] in employer-based insurance
find patterns of spending on various services consistent with service-
level selection among competing at-risk plans. Ellis et al. [5] rank
services according to incentives to undersupply them. Consistent with
service-level selection, they show that HMO-type plans tend to
underspend on services (in relation to the average) just as the
selection index predicts. This pattern of spending is not observed
among enrollees in unmanaged plans. An alternative interpretation,
however, is that HMO plans are better at managing diseases that tend
to be predictable, i.e., chronic illnesses where the ability to manage
care is more feasible, and so reduce spending more for these diseases
than for others in relation to less-managed plans. This latter
interpretation is supported by the findings of Newhouse et al. [14].’’
10 The insured may differ in tastes or in their preference for
efficiency. For example, some insured may (ceteris paribus) have a
low propensity to use healthcare services or prefer to make use of
healthcare services in an efficient way, while other consumers may
have opposite preferences.
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of perfect risk equalization,11 when the cross-subsidies as
intended by the regulator are fully achieved.
Underestimation because positive and negative selection
effects cancel out
Even if the average residual expenses per insurer would be
adjusted for the differences in efficiency among insurers,
they may underestimate the true risk selection. One reason
is that several forms of risk selection, both positive and
negative, may occur simultaneously; therefore, positive
and negative selection effects may cancel out. For example,
an insurer may have an overrepresentation of selected
groups of undercompensated insured (e.g., due to offering
the best care for the chronically ill) as well as an over-
representation of selected groups of overcompensated
insured (e.g., due to selective advertising).
Underestimation because of selection within the insurers’
portfolio
A second reason why the insurers’ average residual
expenses may be an underestimation of the true risk
selection is related to the level of measurement. The risk
equalization is mostly done at the level of risk-bearing
insurers, while each insurer is often allowed to offer several
health plans with different premium rates. Because risk
selection may (often) take place at the health plan level,
ideally, the average residual expenses should be measured
at the health plan level and not at the insurer level. How-
ever, often the regulator and researchers only have access
to expenditures data at the insurer level. If an insurer has
one health plan with positive risk selection and another
health plan with negative risk selection, the positive and
negative selection effects may (partly) cancel out at the
insurer level. In that case, the average residual expenses at
the insurer level underestimate the true risk selection. In
reality there may be serious market segmentation within the
insurer’s portfolio’, if the undercompensated insured
choose a health plan with a high premium and the
overcompensated insured choose a health plan with a low
premium.12
Underestimation because selection actions may be
‘unsuccessful’
A third reason why the insurers’ average residual expenses
may be an underestimation of the true risk selection is
because ‘‘actions with the goal’’ may not be successful and
therefore not reflected in the insurers’ average residual
expenses. For example, in the extreme, if all insurers are
equally successful in risk selection and have an identical
risk composition of their insured, the average residual
expenses are zero for each insurer, apart from differences
in efficiency. Nevertheless, there may be substantial risk
selection, with all of its negative effects (e.g., distorting the
quality of care).
Overrepresentation of over- or undercompensated
groups
A second way of measuring risk selection is to measure
whether insurers have, ideally per health plan, an over-
representation of selected groups of insured who are over-
or undercompensated (e.g., groups such as those illustrated
in Table 2). However, this measure of risk selection is also
an underestimation of the true risk selection because
overcompensated subgroups may partly cancel out under-
compensated subgroups, and because selection actions may
be ‘unsuccessful’ (see ‘‘Underestimation because selection
actions may be ‘unsuccessful’’’).
In applying this measure of risk selection it is necessary to
know which selected groups are over- or undercompensated
by the relevant risk equalization formula (as illustrated in
Table 2).Aproblemwith applying thismeasure in practice is
that often the necessary data are not routinely available. An
option is to hold a health survey among enrollees of one or all
insurers or health plans. However, such a survey may be
quite costly and potentially subject to selection bias (due to
selective response) and manipulation.
11 We implicitly assume that (1) the regulator does not want to give
lower equalization payments for insured who ceteris paribus prefer to
make use of health care services in an efficient way; and that (2) the
medical expenses function is additively separable in a set of risk
factors for which the regulator wants to compensate the insurers via
the risk equalization and a set of risk factors for which this is not the
case (such as the ‘efficiency at the insured level’). If the second
assumption is not fulfilled, it is impossible to get a precise estimate of
risk selection because efficiency and risk selection cannot be
disentangled [16].
12 A successful example of this type of risk selection is the building
of so-called ‘conglomerates of insurers’ by Swiss insurers. In 2007,
the most successfully risk-selecting conglomerate in Switzerland had
14 different insurers with very different premiums ranging from very
cheap to rather expensive, and the salesmen of this conglomerate
were very successful in ‘channeling enrollees to the insurer with a
premium that best corresponded to their expected expenses’ [22].
Despite the community rating per insurer, the cross-subsidies as
intended by the regulator are then not achieved.
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Signals of risk selection
If the above-mentioned measures of risk selection indicate
the existence of risk selection, this is sufficient for knowing
that risk selection is indeed present. However, the reverse
is not true. If the measures do not indicate that there is risk
selection, this does not mean that risk selection is absent.
Yet there still might be (substantial) selection (see
‘‘Residual expenses’’). Therefore, as a third method we
provide a list of signals of selection that can be measured
and that, in particular in combination, can show evidence
of risk selection.13 We do not pretend to present a complete
list of all possible signals. We primarily focus on type-1
actions because these may have the most worrisome con-
sequences (e.g., distorting the quality level of care). Mea-
surement of these signals of risk selection is also useful in
the case that the above-mentioned measures of risk selec-
tion indicate that risk selection is present, but it is still
unknown which forms of risk selection this entails, and
with which effects. It is important to note that the extent to
which certain observed actions can (or cannot) be charac-
terized as risk selection crucially depends on the quality of
the risk equalization system. For example, actions with the
effect of having only young insured can be considered as
risk selection only if age is not included as a risk adjuster in
the risk equalization formula. Because in most countries
the model for calculating the risk equalization payment is
continuously improved, the measurement of (signals of)
risk selection is a dynamic process. Actions that are cur-
rently considered as risk selection may no longer be risk
selection after improving the risk equalization. Therefore,
for the right interpretation of observed actions, it is nec-
essary to know which selected groups of insured are over-
or undercompensated, and to what extent (see, e.g.,
Table 2).
Health plan differentiation via contracting and delivering
care
In different countries, insurers have different tools for
contracting, organizing, managing, and delivering health-
care.14 The use of each of these tools may result in health
plan differentiation and market segmentation, as different
(risk-)groups of insured prefer different health plans.
Therefore, dependent on the quality of the risk equaliza-
tion, the application of each of these tools can be
considered as risk selection. For making a list of signals of
such risk selection it is important to know (1) which
selected groups of insured are over- or undercompensated,
and (2) what degrees of freedom the insurers have in dif-
ferentiating their health plans.
In several countries, insurers are free to negotiate with
the providers of healthcare about the quality and price of
healthcare, including the providers’ financial incentives
(e.g., pay for performance, or risk sharing). Insurers and
providers may agree on protocols for medical treatments
and the level of efficiency of the care, i.e., the price-quality
ratio, e.g., of implants, pharmaceuticals, medical devices,
and diagnostic tests. Another degree of freedom is that
insurers can selectively contract with preferred providers
only, and can decide on the level of reimbursement in case
an insured is treated by non-contracted providers. It is not
difficult to imagine how these tools can be applied with the
goal or the effect of market segmentation such that the
over- and undercompensated people end up in different
health plans with different premium rates.
The regulator can measure the following signals of risk
selection. First, the regulator can monitor the quality of the
contracted providers, the level of reimbursement of selec-
ted pharmaceuticals, the level of reimbursement of care
received from selected non-contracted providers, and the
rules for necessary pre-authorization.
A second option is that the regulator holds interviews
with representative organized groups of undercompensated
patients that negotiate with the insurers about price, qual-
ity, and the insurer’s purchasing strategy. The regulator
could ask them questions such as: Which health plans do
(not) allow you to have much influence on the quality of
care, on the selected preferred providers, and on the com-
position of the supplementary insurances? Do you have the
feeling of (not) being welcome with certain health plans?
A third option is that the regulator holds interviews with
providers of care who specialize in treating chronic con-
ditions of undercompensated patients. Questions could
include: Is it difficult for you to get a contract with insur-
ers? Which health plans in particular present a challenge?
These answers can be compared with the answers by other
providers.
Finally, the regulator can create opportunities for
whistle-blowing, e.g., by employees of insurers who have
ethical problems with their insurer’s policy and their own
duties.
Health plan differentiation via service level
Health plan differentiation can also take place by differ-
entiating the service levels of health plans, such as: having
all contacts with the insured only via internet and email,
rather than having an office building; the speed and quality
13 Studies providing empirical evidence of signals of risk selection
are e.g., Shmueli and Nissan-Engelcin [19], Mehrotra et al. [8],
Bauhoff [1], Grunow and Nuscheler [6], Riley et al. [15], McWilliams
et al. [9], and Newhouse et al. [13]. For a list of anecdotal evidence of
risk selection, see e.g., Van de Ven et al. [21, 22].
14 For a list of such tools, see e.g., Van Kleef et al. [25] and Van de
Ven et al. [23].
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of answering emails and phone calls; and advice to patients
when the insurer acts as an intermediary for patients asking
for guidance about the best providers or about waiting
times.
Differentiation of service level can take place at a per-
sonal level. For example, based on administrative data such
as costs and utilization from prior years, insurers may be
able to qualify an insured as an over- or undercompensated
risk type. If the insurer expects that a certain individual is
overcompensated, the insurer may offer him/her short
response times and excellent mediation when care is nee-
ded, and the opposite when the insurer expects that the
individual is undercompensated.
The regulator can monitor these tools for risk selection
by means of interviews with selected groups of insured or
via ‘mystery’-insured: on the one hand, very healthy
(overcompensated) persons, and on the other hand,
unhealthy (undercompensated) patients with several
chronic conditions.
Selective marketing, also by insurance agents
There are many ways that insurers can selectively market
their health plans. In addition, many people do not buy
their health plan directly from the insurer but via an
insurance agent, i.e., a person or organization that advises
and assists consumers regarding insurance products.
Insurers often provide insurance agents with a bonus fee
for each (new) applicant. Whereas insurers have to respect
open enrollment, this generally does not apply to agents.
Insurance agents can easily distinguish between over- and
undercompensated individuals (e.g., just by observing and
asking questions about health status) and use this infor-
mation when channeling applicants to health plans.
The regulator can monitor this tool for risk selection by
analyzing the marketing activities of all insurers and their
insurance agents. In which media do they advertise? What
is their marketing strategy? Who is the target group? What
is the insurer’s image? Are over- and undercompensated
people equally attracted by the marketing campaign? Do
selected groups of consumers receive special (financial)
benefits if they purchase a health plan, e.g., free supple-
mentary insurance or rebates on other (insurance)
products?
Selective enrollment and disenrollment
To measure signals of selective enrollment and disenroll-
ment the regulator could submit so-called ‘mystery’-ap-
plications to insurers and insurance agents, and let
‘mystery’-insured ask for more information by letter,
email, phone, and internet: this would seek to compare
experiences from overcompensated (very healthy) persons
and undercompensated persons (unhealthy patients with
specific chronic conditions).
Another option is to hold interviews with insured con-
sumers who switched insurers or health plans and ask
them: Why did you switch? Were you not satisfied with the
quality level of care that was delivered or contracted by
your previous insurer or health plan? Did you have the
feeling of not being welcome with your previous insurer?
Did you have the feeling of being kicked out?
Supplementary insurances and other tie-in products
Supplementary insurances can also be an effective tool for
risk selection. This holds true in particular if (1) health
plans and supplementary insurances are (seemingly) sold as
one product, and (2) no special regulation applies to sup-
plementary insurances. The latter implies that insurers are
free to require new applicants for supplementary insur-
ances to fill out a health questionnaire, to reject applicants,
and/or to charge risk-rated premiums for supplementary
insurances. This is the case in, e.g., the Netherlands and
Switzerland [23]. The outcomes of a health questionnaire
for supplementary insurance may help insurers to distin-
guish between applicants who are expected to be over- and
undercompensated for regulated basic health insurance. By
rejecting high-risk individuals for supplementary insur-
ances (or by charging them excessive premiums for sup-
plementary insurances), an insurer will be unattractive for
these individuals.
In addition, insurers may give special financial benefits to
the overcompensated insured if they purchase a health plan,
e.g., rebates on other insurance products such as car insur-
ance, fire insurance, or travel insurance. As soon as these
insured switch to another health insurer, they no longer
receive the rebates on these other products. The Dutch
government facilitated such market segmentation and risk
selection by allowing that health plans may provide up to
10 % in rebates to members of a ‘group’. This stimulated the
forming of selected risk-groups. About two-thirds of the
Dutch population have purchased their health plan via a
‘group’. Such groups can be organized by any legal entity
(e.g., employers, shops, sports clubs, patient organizations,
and private initiatives). Whereas insurers have to respect
open enrollment, groups are free to reject applicants. For
example, anyone can organize a group of overcompensated
individuals and negotiate with insurers about (financial)
benefits for the group. There are many examples of risk
selection in the Netherlands via groups [10].15
15 This type of selection could be easily avoided by prohibiting such
types of rebates. However, this would reduce the consumers’ option to
form powerful consumer groups that can effectively negotiate with
the insurers.
How can the regulator show evidence of (no) risk selection in health… 175
123
The regulator can monitor these forms of risk selection
by closely monitoring the market and the insurers’
behavior with respect to supplementary insurances and
other (insurance) products, ‘groups’, and via ‘mystery’-
applications for supplementary insurances and health
plans. Do only selected (overcompensated) groups of
consumers receive special financial benefits if they pur-
chase a health plan? Finally, in the case of strong signals
of risk selection, the regulator can measure whether an
insurer, a health plan, or a group has an overrepresenta-
tion of over- or undercompensated groups (see ‘‘Over-
representation of over- or undercompensated groups’’)
and, if the regulator is authorized to do so, the regulator
can ask for the reports of meetings of relevant employees
working for the insurer.
Priorities
The measurement of all possible signals of risk selection
is very costly. Therefore, the regulator should set priori-
ties. The regulator should make a good estimate of the
likelihood of different forms of risk selection and the
seriousness of its consequences, both in the short and in
the long run. For example, a form of risk selection that
only results in one group of consumers paying 100 euro
per year more than another group, could be considered
lower than the social loss resulting from a form of risk
selection that distorts the quality of care and thereby
reduces or eliminates the access to good quality care for
the underpriced high-risk patients. By multiplying the
estimated probability of each form of risk selection with
its estimated social loss, the regulator may give priority to
potential signals of forms of risk selection with the
highest expected social loss.
Effective supervision can also prevent undesired forms
of risk selection. In any case, the regulator must have a
permanent update of which selected groups of insured are
over-and undercompensated by the current risk equaliza-
tion, and to what extent.
Showing the absence of risk selection is impossible
Showing the absence of risk selection requires showing the
absence of ‘‘actions with the intention and/or the effect that
the cross-subsidies as intended by the regulator are not
fully achieved’’.
If risk equalization is perfect, risk selection is absent.
However, it is impossible to show that the risk equalization
is perfect. Perfect risk equalization exists if and only if
there exists no single group of over- or undercompensated
insured. Because in principle the number of subgroups is
unlimited, it is practically impossible to show that there
exists no single group of over- or undercompensated
insured.16
If risk equalization is imperfect, it is also impossible to
show the absence of risk selection. In principle, the number
of actions that can be qualified as risk selection is unlim-
ited. It is impossible to show the absence of all these
actions. Showing that all insurers or all health plans have
an equal risk portfolio of insured is also no proof of the
absence of risk selection, because all insurers or all health
plans could be equally successful in risk selection. It could
also mean that with one or more insurers there is both
positive risk selection (e.g., an underrepresentation of
chronically ill insured) and negative risk selection (e.g., an
overrepresentation of low-educated low-income people),
and that these selection effects cancel out. Finally, not
rejecting the null-hypothesis ‘‘that a selected group of
insured is not over- or undercompensated’’ with a certain
level of statistical significance is not a proof that ‘‘the
selected group of insured is not over- or undercompen-
sated’’. Possibly, this group is over- or undercompensated,
but the size of the group is too small to come to statistically
reliable conclusions, e.g., in the case of rare diseases.
The conclusion is that although the evidence of risk
selection can be shown with a specified level of statistical
significance, it is impossible to show the absence of risk
selection.
Showing evidence of risk selection
among switchers: empirical evidence
In ‘‘Biased estimates of selection because of differences in
insurers’ efficiency’’ we argued that, because of differences
in insurers’ efficiency, the insurers’ average residual
expenses are biased measures of risk selection. In this
section we will present measures of risk selection that are
not influenced by that bias. However, our estimates may
underestimate the true level of risk selection for the reasons
mentioned in the sections ‘‘Underestimation because pos-
itive and negative selection effects cancel out’’ through
‘‘Underestimation because selection actions may be
‘unsuccessful’’’.
We used 2-year administrative data on healthcare
expenses and risk characteristics of nearly all individuals
with basic health insurance in the Netherlands (N[ 16
million). For each individual we calculated the residual
expenses in both 2008 and 2009 as the consumer’s actual
health expenses minus his predicted expenses based on the
risk equalization model of 2012. For each year, we know
with which of the 25 insurers each consumer is enrolled.
16 This also implies that it is impossible to show the absence of
incentives for risk selection.
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Our estimates of risk selection are not affected by the
‘‘bias because of differences in insurers’ efficiency’’ for the
following reasons. We can exclude any effect of efficiency
at the insured level because at that time no insurer had a
specific reputation of ‘appropriate and no unnecessary
care’. In addition, we are not aware of any selection action
that could have resulted in an overrepresentation of insured
‘who prefer to make use of healthcare services in an effi-
cient way and have a low propensity to use healthcare
services’. To eliminate the effect of efficiency at the in-
surer level, we restricted our analysis to the residual
expenses of the 500,000 switchers on 1 January 2009 only.
A switcher is defined as an insured who on 31 December
2008 is insured with another insurer than on 1 January
2009. For the group of consumers who newly enrolled in
insurer X, we calculate the average residual expenses in the
year before the switch (2008), and for the group of con-
sumers who disenrolled from insurer X we calculate the
average residual expenses in the year after the switch
(2009). It is plausible to assume that these residual
expenses, which are influenced by the average efficiency of
all other insurers17 and not by the efficiency of insurer X,
are all influenced by the national average efficiency. Then,
we can interpret these average residual expenses of the
switchers per insurer as an average over- or undercom-
pensation by the risk equalization system. In the case of
significant over- or undercompensation, by definition, there
is risk selection.
Our results are presented in Table 4. For most health
insurers we found significant risk selection among their
switchers on 1 January 2009. In the year after disenroll-
ment the overcompensation ranged from -192 to ?129
euro per insured. Most remarkable is insurer 25, who had
both the highest average overcompensation on new enrol-
lees and the highest average undercompensation on those
who disenrolled. This insurer also had the lowest ‘average
residual expenses’ per insured for non-switchers.
All estimates of risk selection as presented in Table 4
may underestimate the true risk selection for the three
reasons mentioned in the sections ‘‘Underestimation
because positive and negative selection effects cancel out’’
through ‘‘Underestimation because selection actions may
be ‘unsuccessful’’’. In addition, based on our results we do
not know which forms of risk selection took place, and
what their effects are. In other words, we now know that
there is risk selection on the Dutch health insurance mar-
ket, but we do not (yet) know to what extent it threatens the
quality of care for chronically ill people, or reduces the
affordability and efficiency of healthcare. To prevent any
potential ‘hidden negative effects for society’ of selection
from continuing to exist, the Dutch regulator may use the
list of signals of selection that can be measured and that, in
particular in combination, can show evidence of risk
selection (see ‘‘Signals of risk selection’’). In addition, the
regulator can reduce the (potential) underestimation of the
true risk selection in our estimates by repeating our anal-
ysis on the level of health plans rather than insurers. We
did not have data at the level of the health plans at our
disposal, but the regulator has the power to access these
data. To test for stability, the regulator may also perform
such analysis for consecutive years. Eventually, the regu-
lator can take actions to reduce or avoid negative effects.18
Conclusion and discussion
Risk selection is the Achilles heel of a competitive health
insurance market with risk equalization and premium rate
restrictions. Even with the best risk adjustment formulas
currently in practice, the insured and insurers are con-
fronted with substantial incentives for risk selection. If risk
selection occurs, it may threaten the quality of care for
chronically ill people, and may reduce the affordability and
efficiency of healthcare. The two largest health insurers, as
well as the National Association of Health Insurers in the
Netherlands gave public warnings that insurers are finan-
cially discouraged to invest in good quality care for
undercompensated patients.19 Therefore, an important
question is: How can the regulator show evidence of (no)
risk selection? Although this seems easy, the conclusion of
our paper is that showing such evidence is not
straightforward.
We provided a conceptual framework for showing evi-
dence of risk selection in competitive health insurance
markets. We defined risk selection as ‘actions (other than
risk rating per plan) by consumers and insurers with the
goal and/or the effect that the cross-subsidies as intended
by the regulator are not fully achieved’.
17 To verify that the new enrollees and those who disenrolled were
not disproportionally distributed among the other insurers, we
performed two calculations. We calculated for each insurer the
weighted average of the financial results (2008-data) of the 24
insurers where its new enrollees came from. This measure ranged
among the 25 insurers from -9 to ?6 euro (with one exception: -29
euro) and was never statistically significant. Similarly, the weighted
averages of the financial results (2009-data) of the 24 insurers to
which the disenrollees switched ranged from -15 to ?16 euro and
were never statistically significant.
18 For potential actions to do so, see e.g., Van de Ven and Ellis [20].
19 Achmea (2011), Letter of Achmea to the members of Parliament, 7
September 2011 (obtainable from the Clerk of Parliament or from the
first author); and speech by Ab Klink, member of the Board of VGZ at
the 14th Clingendael European Health Forum, The Hague, 26 March
2014, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPeXKppJeUE, and
the letter of Zorgverzekeraars Nederland sent to the Minister of
Health, 18 July 2014 (see ZN-Journaal nr. 30–31, www.zn.nl).
How can the regulator show evidence of (no) risk selection in health… 177
123
A measure of risk selection could be the ‘‘average
residual expenses per insured’’ calculated for each insurer.
Because an insurer’s residual expenses are influenced by
both selection and the insurer’s efficiency, this measure is a
biased indicator of selection. We suggested two methods to
measure risk selection that are not biased by the insurers’
efficiency (see ‘‘Residual expenses’’ and ‘‘Overrepresen-
tation of over- or undercompensated groups’’). However,
these measures underestimate the true risk selection.
Therefore, we also provided a list of signals of selection
that can be measured and that, in particular in combination,
can show evidence of risk selection (see ‘‘Signals of risk
selection’’). It is impossible to show the absence of risk
selection (see ‘‘Showing the absence of risk selection is
impossible’’).
Because in most countries the model for calculating the
risk equalization payment is continuously improved, the
measurement of (signals of) risk selection is a dynamic
process. Actions that today are qualified as risk selection
may no longer be risk selection after improving risk
equalization.
Finally, we empirically estimated risk selection among
switchers, taking into account the insurers’ efficiency.
Based on 2-year administrative data on healthcare expenses
and risk characteristics of nearly all individuals with a
basic health insurance in the Netherlands (N[ 16 million),
we find significant risk selection for most health insurers.
The estimated risk selection may underestimate the true
risk selection. After 25 years of discussion about risk
selection, this is the first hard empirical evidence of risk
selection in the Dutch health insurance market.
Based on our results we now know that there is risk
selection in the Dutch health insurance market, but we do
not (yet) know to what extent it threatens the quality of
care for chronically ill people, or reduces the affordability
and efficiency of healthcare. To prevent potential ‘hidden
negative effects for society’ of selection from continuing to
exist, the Dutch regulator may use the list of signals of
selection that can be measured and that, in particular in
combination, can show evidence of risk selection (see
‘‘Signals of risk selection’’). In addition, the regulator can
reduce the (potential) underestimation of the true risk
selection in our estimates by repeating our analysis on the
level of health plans rather than insurers. To test for sta-
bility, the regulator may also perform such analysis for
consecutive years.20 Eventually, the regulator can take
actions to reduce or avoid negative effects.
Because the Netherlands has an advanced risk-equal-
ization formula, it is likely that risk selection also occurs in
other countries with similar regulation, such as Germany,
Israel, Switzerland, and the United States (Medicare
Advantage; Health Insurance Exchanges). Regulators in
these countries should be eager to counteract risk selection
and its negative effects.
Table 4 Average overcompensation (Euros) in 2008 of ‘new enrol-
lees on 1 January 2009’ and average overcompensation in 2009 of
‘disenrollees on 1 January 2009’, per insurer, after applying the Dutch
risk equalization model 2012 (excluding the costs of mental care)
Health
insurer (in
2009)
Enrollees on 1 January
2009
Disenrollees on 1 January
2009
Average overcompensation
in the year before the
switch (2008)
Average
overcompensation in the
year after the switch
(2009)
1 123* –27
2 35 –54
3 –45 –142
4 39* 17
5 77* –5
6 68* 66*
7 45* 129*
8 60* 78*
9 132 –47
10 70* –12
11 –10 –35
12 81* 41*
13 108* 5
14 75* 55*
15 112* 13
16 13 40
17 81* 38
18 123* 89*
19 197* 26
20 115* 58*
21 163* –50
22 126* 57
23 116* –3
24 76 30
25 201* –192*
The insurers are ordered based on decreasing ‘average residual
expenses’ in 2009 for the non-switchers (with insurer 25 having the
lowest ‘average residual expenses’). The average expenses per
insured in 2009 were 1570 euro
Source Van de et al. [24]
Negative overcompensation = undercompensation
* Significant (p\ 0.05)
20 After finishing our study (in 2014), the Dutch regulator performed
a similar analysis as we did for several consecutive years and found
similar results (as in Table 4), which were quite stable over time. The
regulator also announced plans to do the same analysis at the level of
health plans (rather than insurers) and also to use a selection of the
‘list of signals of selection’ as mentioned in this paper. See
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit [11].
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Policy recommendations
Based on our study we come to the following policy rec-
ommendations. First, because measuring all signals of risk
selection is very costly, the regulator should set priorities.
The regulator should make a good estimate of the likelihood
of different forms of risk selection and the seriousness of the
consequences, both in the short and long run. Second, the
regulator should permanently monitor the market, in par-
ticular, as long as insurers do not advertise for all groups of
chronically ill people, e.g. ‘‘Come with us because we have
contracted the best doctors for your disease’’. Third, a nec-
essary condition for monitoring risk selection is that the
regulator always has a permanent update of the extent to
which selected groups of insured are over- or undercom-
pensated by the current risk equalization (such as is illus-
trated in Table 2). Fourth, the measurement of risk selection
should ideally be done at the health plan level rather than the
insurer level. Finally, because most forms of risk selection in
most countries are not a violation of the legislation, it is not
straightforward that the regulator has sufficient tools to
counteract undesired risk selection. Therefore, it is recom-
mended to make an inventory of the tools that the regulator
has available to counteract undesired forms of risk selection,
and if necessary, to extend these tools or to take other mea-
sures. It goes without saying that the best way to prevent risk
selection is by reducing or eliminating the incentives for risk
selection, ideally by improving the risk equalization.
Highlights
• With imperfect risk equalization there are incentives for
risk selection.
• It is not easy to disentangle risk selection and the
insurers’ efficiency.
• Many signals of risk selection can be measured.
• It is impossible to show the absence of risk selection.
• Our empirical results provide evidence of risk selection
among switchers.
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